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Of “Texans” and “Custers”:
Maximizing Welfare and Efficiency
Through Informal Norms
M. Alexander Pearl*

ABSTRACT
Professor Robert Ellickson (Yale) theorized that the informal
norms of a close-knit community maximize aggregate welfare and
Professor Barak Richman (Duke) identified two distinct types of
private ordering systems: “shadow of law” and “order without law.”
Under the Ellickson-Richman structure, many Indian tribes
qualify as close-knit groups where informal norms effectively
operate. The additional trait of isolation—both geographic and
cultural—makes them ideal communities for the prioritization of
informal norms. The imposition of external law, such as state law,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of
Law. Enrolled member of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma. This article,
or portions of it, has been presented to the faculties of Stetson University
College of Law, the University of New Mexico School of Law, Florida Coastal
School of Law, and St. Thomas University School of Law (Miami, FL). I had
the opportunity to discuss various ideas from this paper at the Berkeley Law
Symposium “Heeding Frickey’s Call.” I am forever indebted to Professor
Frickey for his teaching and wisdom. There are many colleagues and friends
who contributed to my thinking about these issues. Among them, I’d like to
thank Hannibal Travis, Manuel Gomez, Matthew Mirow, Howard
Wasserman, Tom Baker, Tracy Hresko Pearl, Matthew Fletcher, Ezra
Rosser, Sarah Krakoff, Dr. Kelly Fayard, Curtis Berkey, Scott Williams,
Rovianne Leigh, Mary Louise Frampton, Keith Harper, Dennis M. Gingold,
John C.F. Loving, Robert Harmala and the myriad tribal leaders and
advocates who have shared their knowledge and opinions with me. A special
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is harmful and unnecessary to the maintenance of order in these
communities. Recent legislative efforts to ameliorate criminal
problems in Indian Country miss the mark and an alternative
solution prioritizing the operation of informal norms and private
ordering should prevail over application of external law and
structures.

Of “Texans” and “Custers”: Maximizing Welfare
and Efficiency Through Informal Norms
“The Haileys refer to him as a ‘Texan’—a term that in
Shasta County connotes someone who is both an
outsider and lacks neighborly instincts.” 1
—Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law.
“There are better ways to solve these problems than by
bringing in the 7th Cavalry and wiping them out. I
would say we are in a war right now.” 2
—Former Chairman of the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians
on the Riverside County Police Department’s conduct regarding
tribal members.
In his famous work, Order Without Law, Professor Robert
Ellickson provides “a real-world perspective” on the Coase
Theorem.3 Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost is one of the
most influential works on the law, giving rise to what would
become called the Coase Theorem.4 The Coase Theorem—a term
he never used to describe his own work—is often misunderstood
and is subject to a variety of interpretations. 5 For purposes of this
1. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 63 (Harvard Univ. Press
1991).
2. David Kelly, Riverside County Tribal Members are Angry After Two
Latest Killings by Deputies, L.A. TIMES LOCAL (May 14, 2008),
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-soboba14-2008may14,0,5062286
.story#axzz2jPqlW5cl.
3. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id.
5. Compare Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and
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article, I employ Professor Ellickson’s recitation of the Theorem
that “when transaction costs are zero, a change in the rule of
liability will have no effect on the allocation of resources among
the parties.” 6
This article expands upon Ellickson’s assessment of how
social behavior is affected by law and other forces, such as the
informal norms in a given social group. His hypothesis states that
“members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms
whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.” 7
Ellickson’s empirical study of Shasta County provides a close look
at how a “close-knit community” will encourage cooperative
behavior within the group, without resort to external law, simply
by application of diffuse informal community norms. 8 Ellickson’s
treatment of the position of law as central or peripheral to the
behavior of community members is representative of a larger legal
philosophical debate between Law and Society followers, and
those in the Law and Economics camp.9
The first quote from Ellickson’s book introduces the idea that
within a close-knit group, “Texans,” exist as those whose behavior
consistently deviates from the informal normative expectations. 10
One of Ellickson’s points is that the exercise of informal norms,
including rewards and punishments, in a close-knit group
effectively addresses internal deviations from expected behavior in
a more efficient and welfare maximizing manner. 11
The second quote is a statement made by a former chairman
of the Soboba Band of Indians located in Riverside County,
California. 12 The “7th Cavalry” statement refers to General
Custer and his United States 7th Cavalry, who heavily
Acquisition Agreements, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1091 n.33 (2011)
(describing different interpretations of the Coase Theorem), with Daniel Q.
Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem: of Judges Hand and Posner and
Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1999) (challenging the validity of the
Coase Theorem).
6. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Id. at 167.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 168.
10. Id. at 63.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Kelly, supra note 2.
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participated in many battles with various Indian tribes on the
frontier of the United States. 13 I define the term “Custer” as an
individual existing outside of the close-knit group. Consequently,
a Custer is able to supersede the informal norms of the group.
These individuals ignore, or are at least not bound by, the
informal norms of the close-knit group. The remedial actions
taken by members of the close-knit group, therefore, are
ineffective in curtailing a Custer’s deviations from the expected
behavior of the community. This article examines how Texans
and Custers affect the informal norms of the close-knit group and
vice versa, resulting in a conclusion about the extent to which
informal norms should be insulated from the operation of external
mandatory law.
The scope and thesis of this article is narrow, and a few
caveats must be given. This article does not seek to add to the
copious scholarship bearing directly on the Coase Theorem. Nor
does it attempt to join in the legal centralist vs. legal peripheralist
dialogue.
Further still, this article is not a “real-world
perspective” like that accomplished by Ellickson. Instead, this
article attempts to add to the ideas articulated by Ellickson by
applying his hypothesis to other situations beyond property and
tort law—the areas of law typically associated with Coase’s
Theorem.14 Specifically, I argue for the protected operation of
informal norms within certain close-knit groups with regard to the
regulation of criminal conduct.
Legal academia’s interest with informal norms (which goes by
many other names, e.g. private enforcement mechanisms, private
ordering, etc.) is not necessarily new. 15 As Professor Weisberg has
pointed out, the “norms school” has not necessarily discovered a
new idea. 16 Indeed, Weisberg has criticized the norms school for
13. See generally THOM HATCH, THE CUSTER COMPANION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LIFE OF GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER AND THE
PLAINS INDIAN WARS (Stackpole Books 2002). In no way do I intend for this
article to be a referendum on Gen. Armstrong Custer’s conduct, legacy, or life
in general. Instead, I use his mythos and image as expressed by the former
chairman of the Soboba Band as a contrast to the “Texan” archetype
identified in Ellickon’s work.
14. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 3.
15. Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the
Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 740 (2012).
16. Robert Weisberg, Norms and Law: and the Norms of Criminal Law
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engaging in sloppy or merely conclusory analysis of informal
norms in the criminal context. This article is not a response to
Weisberg, but instead attempts to faithfully apply Ellickson’s
theory to certain close-knit groups in the criminal area.
Put simply, the issue explored here concerns the extent to
which informal norms should either (1) preclude, (2) be prioritized
over, or (3) be protected from interference by external mandatory
legal forces. This theory advocates for the protected application of
informal norms—as opposed to state or federal law—in the
criminal context for certain close-knit communities. The theorized
result is that such close-knit groups whose informal norms are
protected from interference by exogenous law will better maximize
aggregate welfare, increase efficiency in member interactions, and
reduce criminal conduct. To use my own terminology, the
preclusion of Custers allows informal norms to operate, thereby
creating better outcome for both members of the close-knit
community (by curtailing Texans) and outsiders.
Part I explains Ellickson’s theory and analyzes other
important contributions made by other scholars. I highlight key
components of Ellickson’s assessment concerning the close-knit
community’s ability to both define and maximize welfare
according to its sui generis values. Part II discusses the taxonomy
of historical and current examples of communities utilizing
informal norms, or private law based mechanisms, to resolve
disputes and how efficient results that maximize welfare (as
defined by the community) are achieved. Part III, addresses the
question of whether government law enforcement interferes with
the close-knit community to an extent great enough to diminish
the efficacy, or existence, of operative informal norms. By
analyzing scholarship on community policing, I explain that while
advocates of community policing and informal norms share similar
goals, community policing is fundamentally adverse to—and
hinders—the operation of informal norms.
Part IV examines anthropological sources to argue that the
unique attributes of various Indian tribes and tribal communities
warrant definition as the type of close-knit communities
contemplated under Ellickson’s theory. Part V explains why the
informal norms of certain tribal communities should be allowed to
Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 469 (2003).
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operate without interference from outside legal forces (Custers).
To set up this section, a historical and present day analysis of
criminal law and jurisdiction in the context of Federal Indian Law
is necessary. I examine the background of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country, the history of Tribal-State relations, and the
resulting fragmentation of criminal jurisdictional authority
between the federal government, tribal governments, and state
governments. I focus on a particular anomaly in Federal Indian
Law, where Indian tribes in certain states are subject to State
criminal jurisdiction, as opposed to Federal criminal jurisdiction.
The consequences of this anomaly in tribal communities are
described through a review of statistics and an analysis of recent
empirical scholarship of the on-the-ground situation for these
certain tribal communities.
Finally, Part VI looks at the relevant provisions in the
recently passed Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 and asks
whether they effectively address the criminal justice issues facing
Indian tribes subject to State criminal jurisdiction. I propose an
alternative way of thinking about the problem of crime in these
areas of Indian Country based on the theory that close-knit tribal
groups are better situated to curtail crime and maximize
community welfare through application of informal norms rather
than through the mandatory imposition of exogenous law.
I.

ORDER WITHOUT LAW: INFORMAL NORMS IN CLOSE-KNIT
COMMUNITIES

Clearly defining the terminology used in this article is
important. This article focuses on the distinction between a “law”
and an “informal norm.” Both are “rules,” but very different types.
Ellickson’s theory sets forth certain types of controllers that create
rules affecting human behavior: first-party, second-party, and
third-party. 17
Rules originating from first-party controllers are called
personal ethics and are enforced by the individual’s own personal
reflections. 18 Second-party controllers are other individuals who
have a direct relationship with the conduct of another person. For
example, in a contract, the promisee has the ability to compel—
17.
18.

ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 130–31.
Id. at 126.
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through rewards and punishments—the promisor to conform his
conduct to the terms of the contract. 19 There is a specific and
direct relationship between the actor and the controller.
Ellickson’s (and my) inquiry focuses on two types of thirdparty controller created rules. Third-party controllers are
subdivided into three types: (1) Social Forces, (2) Organizations,
and (3) Government.20 As Ellickson wrote, “[t]hird-party control
differs from second-party control in that the rules are ones to
which the actor may not have agreed; in addition the sanctions
may be administered by persons not involved in the primary
interaction.” 21 Ellickson’s examined two specific types of thirdparty controllers, Social Forces and Government, and also the
rules that they each create. 22 While both types of third-party
controllers provide rules of behavior, they are distinct in two
primary ways. Social Forces are controllers that are nonhierarchical and unaffiliated with the State. 23 Government, on
the other hand, is hierarchical and is the State. 24
Rules
emanating from Social Forces are called “norms” or informal
norms. 25 The rules created by Government are “laws.” 26
With these terms set out, recall Ellickson’s goal to examine
the Coase Theorem in a real-world perspective. The Coase
Theorem suggests that “law” will not dictate the behavior of the
parties, instead, the parties will bargain to an efficient outcome
regardless of where the law places property entitlements. 27 Coase
did not discuss informal norms. This is Ellickson’s important
contribution stemming from his real world test of the Coast
Theorem. In essence, Ellickson confirmed the outcome of the
Coast Theorem—that law does not dictate the choices and
behavior of individuals under certain circumstances. 28
Ellickson hypothesized that “members of a close-knit group
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
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the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday
affairs with one another.” 29 In other words, under certain
conditions informal norms are more efficient in maximizing
welfare than their exogenous law counterparts.30 This is why
Order Without Law has been so influential. Not only does
Ellickson’s work validate, in a sense, Coase’s Theorem under
certain conditions, but it also provides an additional basis for
explaining why individuals cooperate: informal norms.31
At the same time, Ellickson identifies “words of caution.”32
He reiterates that his theory is plainly inapplicable to non-closeknit groups.33 In addition, he points out that maximizing the
aggregate welfare of a close-knit group may serve to harm or
punish outsiders, including the examples of racial segregation and
Jim Crow laws as evidence of this. 34 Finally, he notes that simply
maximizing the aggregate welfare of the close-knit group may not
be the sole and ultimate goal for the group. He suggests that the
protection of fundamental civil liberties or other concerns may
trump informal norms that would result in maximum aggregate
welfare.35
Bearing those concerns in mind, Ellickson’s work contains
three key concepts that must be clearly laid out: “welfare,”
“workaday affairs,” and “close-knit group.” Ellickson uses the
term “welfare” to include tangible and intangible benefits; in
particular he cautions that the term is not simply reducible to
wealth or money. 36 As examples, Ellickson notes that welfare
“refers to all things and conditions that people value.” 37 Market
prices are a way to measure value for those things traded in the
open market, albeit a crude one.38 However, intangible things
with value cannot be measured because they are not openly
traded, e.g. friendship. 39 Under these circumstances, where there
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 167.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id.
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are a mixture of things and conditions susceptible to both objective
and subjective measures of value, “patterns of social exchange . . .
can help reveal how people value outcomes reached outside the
marketplace.” 40 The close-knit social group and its members
determine the relative values of intangible things and conditions.
In essence, welfare is defined by the community through its
operations.
What are “workaday affairs?” Workaday affairs are those
interactions between the members of the close-knit group that
pertain to their common situation, i.e. that which creates the
close-knit group. In Shasta County, the workaday affairs arose
among the close-knit group of cattle ranchers. They were all
engaged in the same business and interacted with each other
daily. The workaday affairs governed by informal norms are those
that are “ordinary matters” conducted on the stage set by “ground
rules.” 41 The ground rules contemplated by Ellickson are
foundational rules like a concept of private property—under either
a Lockean Labor Theory or a communal theory.42 These
foundational rules are what allow the close-knit group to engage
in voluntary exchange with one another: they allow for the
community members to assign value to things and conditions.
Thus, Ellickson’s theory of welfare-maximizing informal norms
presumes the existence of foundational rules.
Finally, the close-knit group has a very specific definition.
Moreover, it is a central focus in the theory set forth below. Closeknit groups are not simply those individuals who maintain
common connections, interests, or traits. Instead, Ellickson states
that a close-knit group is one where “informal power is broadly
distributed among group members and the information pertinent
to informal control circulates easily among them.” 43
There are two primary components that condition the
existence of a close-knit group and determine the degree of “closeknitedness”: (1) reciprocal power to administer sanctions and
benefits is completely distributed among members of the closeknit group and (2) group member information about the past and

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 177–78.
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present.44
First, the ability to administer sanctions in the future against
other members of the close-knit group must be both widely
distributed and readily deployable. 45 Ellickson analogizes to the
iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma wherein each player
has the same ability to apply sanctions or benefits. 46 The repeat
play aspect of the iterated game compels each player to think long
term because there is a continuing relationship with the other
player. In addition, each player has recurring opportunities to
exercise self-help power over the other. 47 “When relations are
continuing, an enforcer will receive more personal benefits if a
particular sanctionee is induced to act more cooperatively in the
future.” 48
Second, “repeat play by itself is insufficient to induce
Members must have information about the
cooperation.” 49
current circumstances in order to “forecast” the consequences of
their choice to exercise their reciprocal power of self-help. 50 With
regard to past information, a member needs this information in
order to understand how other members of the group operated in
prior instances. 51 Historical information affects the member’s
assessment of his future conduct by giving her an idea of the
severity of previous conduct (cooperative or uncooperative).52
Without historical data, the individual is operating in a vacuum
with no baseline for determining what type of conduct is expected
and the seriousness of deviation from that expectation. It bears
directly on her election to exercise, or withhold, her reciprocal
power.
With these terms defined, Ellickson’s theory finds that within
a close-knit group, the informal norms created among those
members will maximize welfare for the aggregate group,
pertaining to their workaday affairs. 53
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 177–80.
Id. at 178–79.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
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II. PRIVATE LEGAL MECHANISMS

By no means does Ellickson’s theory represent the entirety of
the “norms school of thought.” Professor Richman has skillfully
identified important distinguishing factors of types of informal
norms. 54 His article creates a taxonomy for informal norms based
systems—or private ordering.55 Richman shares at least one view
with Weisberg, scholars writing about informal norms often do so
with imprecision. 56 Consequently, Richman adds structure to
scholarly work on non-public law mechanisms for dispute
resolution.57 Richman divides extralegal mechanisms into two
groups: “those operating in the ‘shadow of the law’ and those that
create ‘order without law.’” 58
The growing fascination in the legal academic community
likely traces its roots to Stewart Macaulay’s 1963 scholarship on
the analysis of the informal norms among businesspeople that
resolve disputes without resorting to legal mechanisms. 59 Fifty
years later, academics remain intrigued, and perhaps befuddled,
by the operational relevance of informal norms. By defining
terms, Richman attempts to bring a degree of clarity to the
continuing discussion of informal norms in legal scholarship.
Richman identifies a fundamental beneficial feature of public
law based dispute resolution: availability among parties. 60 Public
law courts can enforce rules, agreements, and resolve disputes
among perfect strangers; whereas informal norms are likely
ineffective under such social circumstances.61 Systems of private
ordering can operate either in the “shadow of the law” or operate
to create “order without law.” In a shadow of law base system, the
parties’ respective assessments of their positions are
fundamentally informed by their knowledge of how a public law

54. See generally Richman, supra note 15, at 739.
55. Id. at 740.
56. Id. at 741–42.
57. Id. at 743–44.
58. Id.
59. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (“Disputes are frequently
settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual legal
sanctions.”).
60. Richman, supra note 15, at 743.
61. Id.
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court would likely resolve their dispute. 62 The parties have a
reasonably accurate view of their legal rights—something that
entirely relies upon the existence, operation, and use of public law
courts rendering relevant decisions. Without the public law
court’s enforcement of similar disputes, a shadow of law system
simply cannot exist. 63 Shadow of law systems arise among wellinformed parties as a way to resolve disputes, through
cooperation, in a quicker and less expensive manner than that
created by public law courts.64 Arbitration is a formalized version
of such systems; indeed, public law courts readily enforce
arbitration agreements and defer to the arbitrators’ decision so
long as it “draws its essence from the contract.” 65 Richman
summarizes shadow of law systems by stating that “ . . . once legal
entitlements are clearly defined, parties can economize on
litigation costs and reach agreements through Coasean
bargaining. So long as the law’s shadow is well defined, parties
can engage in mutually valuable conduct without assuming the
costs inherent in state-made legal procedures.” 66
Order without law systems are distinct. Owing to Ellickson’s
work, Richman characterizes this system as involving “a much
more categorical rejection of state law and state institutions.” 67
The creation and enforcement of informal norms comes purely
from the community, “they are an alternative to, not an extension
of, formal legal sanctions.” 68 Enforcement mechanisms in order
without law systems vary greatly and are sui generis to the
particular community in which the informal norms exist.
Sanctions can result in economic or social, or both, harm to an
individual deviating from an informal norm. Richman notes that
order without law systems often arise under circumstances where
reliable public law courts are unavailable to parties, therefore
creating a need for consistent and equitable exercise and
62. See id. at 744.
63. See id. at 744–45.
64. See id.
65. Richman, supra note 15, at 745–46; MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A.
Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After
Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 409–11 (2010); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring the national policy favors arbitration).
66. Richman, supra note 15, at 745.
67. Id. at 746.
68. Id. at 747.
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enforcement of informal rules. 69 But, he correctly notes their
continued existence into the present day, as depicted in Ellickson’s
work in Shasta County.70
Richman identifies some costs created by types of private
order systems, whether they are shadow of law or order without
law based. 71 There are significant obstacles to entering such a
community engaged in private ordering. Would-be newcomers to
such communities lack the reputational history that encourages
long-term members of the community to deal with them. 72 Preexisting members of the community are concerned that the
newcomer will turn out to be a Texan, thereby requiring the
community to engage in sanctioning behavior and the application
of informal rules. 73 It is simply easier, more efficient, and less
costly for members of the community to continue to deal with
other long-term members who have reputational good standing.
There is risk involved in branching out, thereby potentially
foreclosing entry into the community to anyone.
This feeling of uneasiness from long-term members of the
community is recognizable in the present day to anyone who has
ever purchased anything online. Online merchants have
reputational ratings. On eBay, prior purchasers leave comments
for individual sellers, allowing anyone to see whether prior
transactions went smoothly.74 Negative comments represent
reputational sanctions that may economically impair the seller in
the future. 75 This is punishment levied by private individuals
without any regard to the law. In a given auction, those sellers
with checkered reputations may command only a reduced number
of bidders on an item readily available by a number of other
sellers. The reduced bidders represent the risk aversion to a seller
with subpar reputation, just as a newcomer will face greater
scrutiny by long-term members in a given community. Even in
disparate communities, such as online auction sales, reputational
sanctions carry weight and no public law court need enter the fray
69. See id. at 747–49.
70. See id. at 747–50.
71. Id. at 758–59.
72. Id. at 758.
73. See id.
74. How Feedback Works, EBAY (Mar. 4, 2013), http://pages.ebay.
comhelp/feedback/howitworks.html.
75. Id.
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to alter patterns of behavior within the community.
This paper is solely concerned with order without law
systems. Moreover, it utilizes the definitional structure created by
Ellickson for the operation of informal norms only under certain
criteria described in Part I. 76 The next section moves from the
commercial transactional context and examines how law and
informal norms operate in the criminal context by analyzing the
scholarship on community policing.
III. INFORMAL NORMS AND CRIMINAL LAW

Thus far, I have reviewed the operation of informal norms in
commercial and transactional settings. Is that the extent of their
application? The next section explores this question by examining
the rise of community policing in the 1980s and its alterations in
recent years. Community policing represents an attempt at the
best of both worlds: informal norms and public law. Much of the
scholarship on community policing uses the term “informal norms”
to describe the purpose of policing and revision of law enforcement
strategies. Utilizing the definition created by Ellickson along with
Richman’s taxonomy of private ordering, I argue that community
policing is not executing informal norm based systems. Instead, I
argue that community policing fundamentally undermines the
operation of informal norms and is simply a delegation of public
law authority to private actors.
The application of the “norms school” of thought to criminal
law is not new. 77 My contribution is to apply Richman’s structural
taxonomy and ask whether community policing is really a system
76.
77.

Supra Part I.
See generally TRACEY L. MEARES & SAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES:
POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES (Beacon Press 1999)
[hereinafter MEARES & KAHAN, URGENT TIMES]; Miriam Hechler Baer,
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 903 (2011); Robert C. Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: of Panhandlers, Skid Rows,
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); Dan M. Kahan,
Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513
(2002) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice
into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31 (2009); David Alan Sklansky, Police and
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005); Robert Weisberg, Norms and Law:
and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
467, 469 (2003).
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of private ordering—either a shadow of law or order without law
system. To begin, it is essential to center the discussion and
community policing can mean a lot of different things. A review of
recent scholarship on community policing is therefore necessary.
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares are two of the most
prominent writers on community policing and empirical data on
crime.78 In 2002, Meares explained that community policing is
ubiquitous and that “many police departments” employ some type
of community policing in their enforcement. 79 David Thacher
wrote “community policing exhorts city police departments to
forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically
everyone: community groups and institutions, property owners,
agencies of city government, other police and security forces,
elected officials, businesses, and so on.” 80 Sarah Waldeck said
that “the community policing moniker has been assigned to so
many different initiatives, no brief summary” can describe it in
detail. 81 In a near tautology, community policing can be thought
of as a general requirement for the police to partner, in some form,
with the surrounding community. 82 This is a shift away from the
idea that police department needed to operate in isolation from
political forces and “monopolize the task of crime control.”83
Waldeck provides some examples of community policing theory in
action, including permanent beat cops visible and accessible on
the streets, community input regarding the type and priority of
enforcement services received, and teaching community residents
about how to protect themselves from becoming victims of crime
78.
See generally Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 66; Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Foreward]; Tracey
Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (2002)
[hereinafter Meares, Praying]; MEARES & KAHAN, URGENT TIMES, supra note
77; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) [hereinafter Meares &
Kahan, Inner City].
79. Meares, Praying, supra note 78, at 1593–94.
80. David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 765 (2001).
81. Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms
Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable With
Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2000).
82. See id.
83. See Thacher, supra note 80, at 765.
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again in the future. 84 For purposes of the “norms school,”
Waldeck notes that police officers in a community policing model
may be taught to try and identify “relationships between
individual events and develop solutions to underlying problems.” 85
This comment directly concerns the convergence of informal
norms theory and criminal law.
Meares and Kahan have argued that individuals do not elect
to violate the law in a vacuum; they are part of a community
where other members’ decisions create norms to violate or not
violate the law in their community.86 This point dovetails, to a
general degree, with the conclusion of the Coase Theorem (law
does not solely determine the outcome between private parties)
and of Ellickson (parties in close-knit groups generate informal
norms that maximize aggregate welfare with respect to workaday
affairs).87 Despite the existence of a law preventing a certain
behavior, a norm may nonetheless arise in a community that
encourages (or at least does not discourage) an individual’s
election to act otherwise. Meares and Kahan advocated for
intervention by community policing utilizing strategies that
reinforce positive norms, so-called order maintenance norms, the
enforcement of which will promote norms that deter crime. 88 This
combats the pre-existing community norms of deviation from
publicly-originated law, but applied via the community through
apparently informal norms.
Meares and Kahan recognize the potentially important role of
informal norms in communities while also understanding that
public law is not necessarily effective at conditioning behavior
under certain circumstances. 89 However, as Richman has noted,
under certain shadow of law systems of private ordering, the law
is influential in recommending behavior and sanctioning
deviations by the community. 90 Community policing, then,
attempts to use the community as the vehicle through which
public law is applied—albeit informed by the partnership in
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Waldeck, supra note 81, at 1254.
Id.
See Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 806.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 2, 167.
Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 815–18.
Id.
See generally Richman, supra note 15.

PEARLFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

48

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/2/2014 10:57 AM

[Vol. 19:32

existence between the police and the community. It nonetheless is
external to the community. The norms which community policing
seek to undermine are the informal norms of the community.
Therefore, there is an inherent antagonistic relationship between
the informal norms of the community and the public law based
informal norms initiated by the community policing strategy and
executed by various members of the community. The norms
imposed by community policing strategies are informal norms in
sheep’s clothing. Despite the cloaking of an informal norm, they
are Custers.
These are not community norms; they have not arisen
organically. They are fundamentally external and foreign to the
community. Community policing strategies like this are alien
solutions to internal problems. Thacher provides a basis for
understanding why these strategies might not succeed:
Any complex society involves differentiation in terms of
roles and values (Durkheim 1960; Walzer 1984), so every
social institution pursues priorities separate from and
potentially in conflict with the others. Consequently,
interorganizational
partnerships
bring
together
institutions committed to potentially incompatible
priorities. The practitioners who manage these
relationships will find themselves in contested normative
terrain, pressured by conflicting social aims that had
formerly been institutionally segregated. To be responsive
to each institution, they must be centrally concerned with
resolving the tensions among those conflicting values. 91
In other words, community policing efforts to cloak public law
as informal norms may face an uphill battle from the outset.
There are so many players and parties in a community with
different values, ideas, and levels of commitment that community
policing’s noble effort to curtail criminal conduct is foundationally
impaired. These observations are familiar because they are the
converse of Ellickson’s definition of the close-knit group. 92 Power
and information are not broadly distributed among the members
of the group. Therefore, informal norms will not maximize
aggregate welfare on workaday affairs under these circumstances.
91.
92.

Thacher, supra note 80, at 766.
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177.
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Much of the scholarship on community policing focuses on
inner-city or urban areas. These communities perhaps do not
meet the definition of a close-knit group set up by Ellickson—
where informal norms are at their zenith in terms of influence.
Recall, close-knit groups must have an even distribution of
reciprocal power to punish others and have accurate information
about the past and present community. 93 For example, power
imbalances may exist in these inner-city and urban areas thereby
removing the ability of one individual to levy punishment against
another. As a consequence, informal norms are significantly
weaker in their ability to condition an individual’s behavior. We
do not know enough about these communities in order to
determine whether they are close-knit in the Ellicksonian sense.
In other words, community policing is not a system of private
ordering. It is best understood as a delegation of public law
authority and rules to private actors. 94 These private actors may
enforce these rules—and perhaps more efficiently than their
public law police officer counterparts—but the rules enforced are
not the informal norms of the community. By definition, they
originated from an exogenous source, rather than organically from
within. At this point, these rules bear little resemblance to those
theorized by Ellickson.
Again, my focus here is not to explain the failure or success of
these types of community policing efforts in communities (closeknit or not). Instead, I focus on the application of the Richman
taxonomy and Ellickson definition in order to provide specificity to
the application of informal norms to criminal conduct under
certain conditions, i.e. close-knit groups. Therefore, my argument
does not concern those communities that lack close-knittedness.
Instead, I argue that informal norms should regulate criminal
conduct—without interference by public law enforcement—where
the community displays a high degree of cohesion and is extremely
close-knit.
A final and important point is that community policing may
preclude the creation of close-knit group informal norms, which
may maximize aggregate welfare for the community.
For
93. See id.
94. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 123 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2001).
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example, the imposition of beat cops working the streets signals a
greater presence of law enforcement from an outside entity. When
that entity enforces public law to curtail behavior, community
members identify public law as the authority, thereby
undermining the creation, efficacy, and operation of informal
norms in the community. As described above by Meares and
Kahan, this is perhaps the point of community policy—to correct
informal norms in the community that encourage individuals to
break the law.95 But, community policing will also crush those
informal norms with positive effects on the community because it
fundamentally impairs the close-knit group’s development of
informal norms. Order maintenance rules do not select which
norms to undermine, they operate to replace the existing norms
and create new ones. The enlistment of non-state actors and
development of crime control partnerships with community
institutions and private entities may well reduce crime rates and
result in healthier, safer communities which are not close-knit.
Community policing may have the unintended consequences of
suppressing the creation of positive informal norms.
IV. TRIBES AS CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITIES

Recall that Ellickson’s definition of a close-knit group requires
that all of the group’s members be able to exercise reciprocal
power of self-help, i.e. sanction the conduct of another member
and that all members have information about the past and
present.96 He states that his theory of informal norms simply
does not apply to transient communities. 97 Of course, certain
communities are more close-knit than others. I suggest an
addition, or refinement, of this qualification that the more isolated
the community, the higher the degree of cohesion will be among
members. This is not new; Ellickson implies as much in a footnote
when he suggests that remote island communities may operate
without a criminal justice system.98
Ellickson warns against construing the definition of close-knit
as a proxy for the characteristic that a group may be small.99
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 78, at 815–18.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 177–80.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 178 n.38.
Id. at 182.
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While a group’s small size may concentrate the degree of closeknittedness, thereby making both the enforcement of norms and
the ability to obtain information about the past and present
easier, it is not a per se requirement. 100 This section is dedicated
to a brief examination of a certain community—Indian tribes—
and the extent to which they may qualify as Ellicksonian closeknit groups along with unique features that may make them more
likely to strongly enforce informal norms.
Communities come in all shapes and sizes. Those that are the
source of legal academic inquiry in the context of informal norms
are particularly colorful: a Tuna Court, 101 stand-up comedians,102
diamond merchants,103 roller-derby participants, 104 ranchers,105
Wisconsin business owners, 106 and now, a brief survey of certain
Indian tribes. 107 Professor Keith Basso describes in great detail
the language, patterns of speech, culture, and importance of place
to the tribal communities of Western Apache Indians. 108 Basso
100. Id.
101. Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s
Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006).
102. Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008).
103. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992).
104. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms
Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012).
105. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 1.
106. See generally Macaulay, supra note 59.
107. This article looks only at certain tribal communities. As an enrolled
tribal member of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, I am constantly awed
by the beautiful diversity of tribal communities. My legal career has given
me the opportunities to witness and interact with Indians in California,
Massachusetts, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, Washington,
Florida, and other places. I cannot stress enough how different all of these
communities are, and while there may be very broad generalities to be made
among these distinct tribes, I must emphasize that each is its own nation,
culture, and people. This article explores the traits in certain tribal
communities, and I make no claim regarding the presence or absence of these
traits in other tribal communities. It may be likely, perhaps very likely, that
other tribal communities have the same or similar traits. But such a claim
would require additional study and support beyond the scope of this article.
108. See generally KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE
AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (Univ. of N.M. Press 1996).
There are many federally recognized Indian tribes that are Western Apache.
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attempts to explain the fundamental philosophical
cosmological distinctions of Western Apache thought:

and

Staying away from places is something that Western
Apaches would not recommend, and . . . they are not
alone. Vine Deloria, Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux), has
observed, most American Indian tribes embrace “spatial
conceptions of history” in which places and their names—
and all that these may symbolize—are accorded central
importance. For Indian men and women, the past lies
embedded in the features of the earth . . . which together
endow their lands with multiple forms of significance that
reach into their lives and shape the ways they think.
Knowledge of place is therefore closely linked to
knowledge of the self, to grasping one’s position in the
larger scheme of things, including one’s own community,
and to securing a confident sense of who one is as a
person.109
Basso attempts to express the importance of place and the
equally important idea that this is connected to the cohesion and
identity of the community. He continues, “[t]he [Western Apache]
sense of place, their sense of tribal past, and their vibrant sense of
themselves are inseparably intertwined. Their identity has
persisted.” 110 Basso then allows the people of Cibecue, Western
Apache individuals, to share their experiences; one said:
I think of the mountain called . . . (White Rocks Lie Above
In A Compact Cluster) as if it were my maternal
grandmother. I recall stories of how it once was at that
mountain. The stories told to me were like arrows.
Elsewhere, hearing that mountain’s name, I see it. Its
name is like a picture. Stories go to work on you like
arrows. Stories make you live right. Stories make you
replace yourself.
—Benson Lewis, age 64, 1979.111
Professor Basso’s work focused on a region of Western Apache people,
Cibecue, located on the Fort Apache Reservation—home of the White
Mountain Apache Nation.
109. Id. at 34.
110. Id. at 35.
111. Id. at 38.
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One time I went to L.A., training for mechanic. It was no
good, sure no good. I start drinking, hang around bars all
the time. I start getting into trouble with my wife, fight
sometimes with her. It was bad. I forget about this
country here around Cibecue. I forget all the names and
stories. I don’t hear them in my mind anymore. I forget
how to live right, forget how to be strong.
—Wilson Lavender, age 52, 1975.112
Basso then states the obvious: the difficulty in interpreting
these statements arises due to their origination from an
“experience in a culturally constituted world of objects and events
with which most of us are unfamiliar.” 113 Here, Basso’s point
about outsiders being unable to comprehend the simple
statements of these individuals resonates in the context of
informal norms and law. Informal norms are sui generis by
definition.114 Ellickson’s point was that the close-knit group
makes collective determinations about the relative value of things
and conditions, that which makes up the aggregate welfare.115
The informal norms are organized, through cooperation, in order
to maximize the aggregate welfare of the community with respect
to the workaday affairs of the members.
The Western Apache have a definition of welfare based on
their place, the stories, and the events that make and have made
them who they are.116 As Basso said, it is their identity.117
Therefore, one might say that the substance of the Western
Apache informal norm is to maintain Western Apache identity.118
Forgetting the stories is something Western Apache are not
supposed to do. 119 Leaving their place is “not recommended.”120
Both amount to a rejection of Western Apache identity.121 These
are the substantive informal norms of the Western Apache: to
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
BASSO, supra note 108, at 34.
Id. at 35.
See generally BASSO, supra note 108.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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respect and honor their identity. 122
Basso goes on to further describe the language and speech
patterns of Western Apache.123 He provides a description of the
types of stories that Western Apache tell. 124 He notes that these
stories belong to all Western Apache.125 They are not localized in
particular people with authority in the community. All in the
community, if they have heard, may tell them. Basso explains
that members of the Western Apache understand the cultural
context in which these stories are to be told, because each type has
an identifiable purpose.126
Relevant for this article, there are stories that are told to
condition behavior. Much literature describes the sanctions of
informal norms in the context of reputation and gossip. For
Western Apache, the sanctions are carried out through the
reminders of who they are as a people, what their identity is, and
the important role that each Western Apache plays in maintaining
that identity as a tribal community. 127 Basso closely studied
Western Apache storytelling,
which holds that oral narratives have the power to
establish enduring bonds between individuals and
features of the natural landscape, and that as a direct
consequences of such bonds, persons who have acted
improperly will be moved to reflect critically on their
misconduct and resolve to improve it. 128
While this could sound like the personal ethics in a system of
first-party control, it misses the interconnectedness of the
community, the stories themselves, and the cultural and
geographic isolation of the tribal community. There is no one else
that understands these stories as they are to be understood in
their cultural context. One, not accustomed to hearing them, has
no frame of reference, philosophically or geographically, thereby
losing the concept of community in the narrative. Basso goes on to

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at xi.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
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say that these stories shape Apache conceptions of themselves.129
This is not a fable designed to convey the importance of telling the
truth; instead, these are stories that explain and express who they
are as people and as a community. 130
Basso identifies the major categories of Western Apache
speech: ordinary talk, prayer, and narrative story. 131 Narrative
stories are further broken down into four types: myth, historical
tale, saga, and gossip. 132 Each type of story has different values,
which “describe the objective that Apache narrators typically have
in recounting them.” 133 Myths are intended to enlighten and
instruct.134 Historical tales attempt to criticize, warn, or “shoot
arrows,” to use the Western Apache phrase. 135 Sagas are for
entertainment. 136 Finally, gossip serves to inform and malign.137
Basso deconstructs examples of each of these types of Western
Apache story, but this article only utilizes Basso’s impressive work
and categorization to demonstrate the complexity of the informal
norms of Western Apache culture and the significant cultural and
geographic isolation implicit in the informal norms. 138
The Western Apache clearly qualify under Ellickson’s
definition of a close-knit group. 139 The ability to condition wrong
behavior is widely distributed among all Western Apache since all
members can tell the stories to those who deviate from the
substance norm of maintaining Western Apache identity. In
addition, the stories themselves convey some of the information
about the past and the present that is required in order for
members of a close-knit group to exercise the reciprocal power of
self-help.
The unique aspect of the Western Apache, and perhaps many
other tribal communities, as compared to other groups meeting
129. Id. at 40–41
130. Id.
131. Id. at 49. The Western Apache spelling of these categories can be
found at: BASSO, supra note 108, at 49.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 50.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally BASSO, supra note 108.
139. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
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Ellickson’s definition is isolation. Isolation can be conceived of in
two senses: (1) geographic and (2) cultural. Close-knit groups
that meet Ellickson’s definition of power and information, who
also contain the trait of being isolated in either sense, are that
much more susceptible to the operation of informal norms.
Therefore, informal norms should be allowed to operate without
the interference of external public law intervention. For Indian
Country, the operation of public law in tribal communities has
been mandatory as opposed to the residents of Shasta County who
may voluntarily opt to utilize public law in the context of a lawsuit
for trespass and damages. 140
The next section explains how public law enforcement in
Indian Country did not always exist, but now presents
fundamental problems for tribal communities.
V. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Crime in Indian Country is not new. How this problem has
been addressed has undergone sweeping legal changes since the
formation of the United States. In order to provide context for
how the problem of crime should be addressed in close-knit tribal
communities, and to properly locate the informal norms theory
within the pre-existing public law framework, a survey of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country is necessary. Criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country is a complex area of federal Indian law and has
generated a great deal of scholarly and empirical interest. In
addition, given Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs, the
prospect of legislative tinkering is omnipresent. 141 This section
provides a history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country,
describes this evolution from preclusive operation of tribal
informal norms to the imposition of exogenous mandatory public
law.
A. Pre-Contact Tribal “Criminal Jurisdiction”
Modern Federal Indian law recognizes Indian tribes as
“domestic dependent nations,” a phrase coined by Chief Justice
140. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in
City Spaces: of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE
L.J. 1165 (1996).
141. See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.142 At best, the
phrase “domestic dependent nation” is a term of art, ill defined if
the phrase is left to be interpreted solely by reference to the words
alone. 143 At worst, it is in inherent conflict and a conundrum for
jurists, legal advocates, tribal leaders, and non-Indians with
interests in Indian Country. 144 One thing is clear, Indian tribes
maintain some degree of self-government.
A fundamental
attribute of a community’s self-governing authority is the
capability to make and enforce rules. Indeed, the enforcement of
these community specific concepts is a “fundamental expression of
a community’s notion of justice.” 145
Since time immemorial, tribal communities have employed
complex political structures to govern all aspects of the
community. 146 As with other communities with defined
governmental processes, Indian tribes “initially had complete
control to express community norms” regarding appropriate and
disapproved conduct. 147 As discussed in this article, even in the
absence of defined governmental processes, order may arise
without law. 148
B. The Increasing Complexity of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian
Country
Many

scholars,

including

myself, 149

have

correctly

142. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
143. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal
Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 437–38 (2005).
144.
See id.
145.
ROBERT ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP FRICKEY & SARAH
KRAKOFF, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, CASES AND COMMENTARY 310–11 (West 2d
ed. 2010).
146.
See SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 14–20
(Univ. of Okla. Press, 1989).
147.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 311.
148.
ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 169. See also Bernstein, supra note 103
(describing the extra legal dispute resolution process in the diamond
industry); Fagundes, supra note 104 (describing informal norms to protect
roller derby pseudonyms); Feldman, supra note 101 (describing a highly
specialized extra legal court to resolve tuna market disputes); Oliar &
Sprigman, supra note 102 (discussing informal norms and self help
enforcement in the comedy industry).
149.
See generally Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring
Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from
Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 185 (2008) (clarifying the complexities
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characterized the structure of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country today as maze-like.150 This section summarizes the
respective jurisdictional authority for tribes, States, and the
federal government. The history of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country illustrates the drastic changes Congress and the
Judiciary can have upon the on-the-ground circumstances of tribal
communities.
1.

Federal Jurisdiction

The first federal foray into altering criminal jurisdiction
among Indian tribes within their territories came as part of the
Trade and Intercourse of 1790, which provided federal jurisdiction
over acts by non-Indians against Indians which “would be
punishable by the laws of [the] state or district . . . if the offense
had been committed against a citizen or white inhabitant
thereof.” 151 Notably, this statute did not reach crimes committed
by Indians.152
In 1817, Congress again altered criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country by extending federal jurisdiction to crimes
committed by “any Indian, or other person or persons.” 153 This
statute is now known as the Indian Country Crimes Act or the
General Crimes Act.154 Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152, the ICCA
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States . . . shall extend to Indian country.” 155 The
1817 amendment contained two exceptions recognizing the
involved in the system).
150. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 8 (Amnesty International 2007); Robert
N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504, 575 (1976); Gideon Hart, A
Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 149 (2010); Hart & Lowther, supra note 149,
at 187.
151. First Trade and Intercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
152. See id.
153. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324
(1978).
154. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324.
155. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
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jurisdiction of tribal governments.156 First, it exempted crimes
committed by one Indian against another Indian. 157 Second, it
precluded federal jurisdiction where it would violate treaty
stipulations specifically providing for tribal jurisdiction. 158
Later, in 1854, Congress created a third exception for
application of the ICCA where an Indian was punished by the
local law of the Tribe. 159 Two of these exceptions, for Indian-onIndian crime and the preclusive operation of Tribal law to punish
an offender, are early examples of public law which expressly
recognizes the existence of a tribal community with powers of selfgovernment.160 These are early expressions of law and policy that
favor the operation of informal norms over the intervention by
mandatory exogenous public law.
Another limitation within the ICCA is that the crime must
occur in “Indian country.” 161 The phrase “Indian country” is
defined at §1151 and includes (1) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, (2) dependent Indian communities, and (3) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished.162 Federal criminal law is not comprehensive, and
it does not include provisions for the variety of criminal conduct in
the same way as state codes. 163 To fill the gaps of the ICCA,
Congress passed the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) in 1825,
which covers “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
thereof.” 164
The ACA further provides that whenever an
individual in an area covered by the ACA
is guilty of an act or omission which, although not made
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
156. Id.
157. Id.
158.
General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); ANDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 145, at 312–13.
159. Act of March 27, 1854, 10 Stat. 270 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2013)).
160. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
161. Id.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)–(c) (2006); see also FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 732 (2005).
163. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 313–14.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1996).
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punishable if committed or omitted within the
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District
in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of
a like offense and subject to a like punishment. 165
The ICCA provided a limited basis for federal jurisdiction, but
even with the ACA filling in gaps, federal jurisdiction within
This fact commanded
Indian Country remained narrow. 166
national attention in the late 1880s culminating with two major
events: the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog (also
known as Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca) and Congress enacting the Major
Crimes Act. 167
In Ex parte Crow Dog, the Supreme Court considered whether
federal jurisdiction existed when one Indian murdered another
Indian. 168 Of course, the circumstance involving Indian-on-Indian
crime was specifically exempted from federal jurisdiction in the
Indian Country Crimes Act. 169 A famous case in federal Indian
law resulted. The facts of Crow Dog leading up to the murder
show very strong political and social forces at work within the
tribal community. 170 Both Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog) and Sinte
Gleska (Spotted Tail) were members of the Brule Sioux Tribe
located in present day South Dakota.171 Both men were respected
leaders within the Brule Tribe, but the two fought with each other
despite the appearance of mutual respect—Sinte Gleska appointed
Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca as the chief of police twice in prior years. 172 On
August 5, 1881, Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca shot and killed Sinte Gleska.173
The event was handled in accord with Brule Tribal rules and
during a tribal council meeting the next day, tribal leaders
ordered an end to the conflict by dispatching mediators to the
165. Id.
166. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 313–14.
167. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
168. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
169. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
170. See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (Frederick Hoxie & Neal Salisbury eds., 1994).
171. Id.
172. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 93.
173. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557; HARRING, supra note 170, at 1, 108–09.
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respective parties to ensure resolution.174 In addition to the
mediation, the families engaged in traditional resolution. In
accord with Brule Tribal law, the family of Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca
provided Sinte Gleska’s surviving family members with $600,
eight horses, and one blanket. 175
Despite the tribal community’s resolution of this intra-tribal
crime, Federal authorities promptly arrested Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca two
days later at the direction of the Indian agent. 176 Apparently, the
Indian agent’s actions were not arbitrary; instead, they were part
of an effort on behalf of the Indian Office—the precursor to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs—to extend federal criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country. 177 In 1883, the Supreme Court in Crow Dog
ruled that federal jurisdiction was lacking because the ICCA
contained an exception for crimes between Indians, and no other
source conferred jurisdiction.178
In response to Crow Dog, in 1885, Congress enacted the Major
Crimes Act (“MCA”). 179 The MCA specifically created federal
jurisdiction over fourteen “major” felonies when committed by an
Indian against Indians or non-Indians in Indian Country. 180 A
year later, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
MCA in United States v. Kagama. 181 The Kagama Court could not
find a specific constitutional provision that authorized Congress to
enact a criminal code for Indian Country but it upheld the law
nonetheless. 182 The Court reasoned that “[t]he power of the
general government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers . . . must exist in [the
federal] government, because it never has existed anywhere
else . . . because it has never been denied; and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all tribes.” 183 Thus, federal jurisdiction exists
174.
HARRING, supra note 170, at 110.
175.
See id. at 110, 104–05 (for more background on tribal law and
custom).
176.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 145, at 93.
177.
Id.
178.
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561–62, 572.
179.
Act of March 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362.
180.
COHEN, supra note 162, at 743; United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d
449, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1984).
181.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
182.
Id. at 379–80, 385.
183.
Id. at 384–85. Kagama is generally known to be the first case
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today in an expanded form. However, it is important to note that
the existence of federal jurisdiction does not divest a tribe of
concurrent jurisdiction over the same crimes. Instead, Congress
retains the ability to adjust criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country to this day, something that plays a key role regarding the
creation of state criminal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in
Indian Country.
2.

Tribal Jurisdiction

Tribal jurisdiction in the pre-contact era was comprehensive
and coextensive with a tribe’s territory. Federal statutes, treaties,
and the judge-made doctrine that the diminishment of tribal
authority due to tribes’ “dependent status” have all chipped away
at tribal criminal jurisdiction since the founding of the United
States. 184 However, federal statutes and case law simultaneously
confirm the continuing capability of tribes, albeit limited, to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and territory.
As described above, the ICCA contains an exception that
precludes federal jurisdiction where a tribe has already punished
the tribal member who committed the criminal act, thereby
recognizing and deferring to a tribal community’s authority to
punish wrongdoers.185 In addition, the MCA does not preclude the
exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who has
committed a major crime sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction.
This principle is reflected in Talton v. Mayers, which ratified
tribal criminal jurisdiction. 186
In Talton, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth
Amendment grand jury and due process clauses applied to tribal
courts exercising criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.187
The Court reasoned that the powers of Indian tribes pre-date the
formation of the Constitution and, therefore, cannot be
constrained by its provisions unless specifically provided for by
confirming the existence of plenary power—or creating such a thing. Plenary
power over Indian affairs is a concept of federal Indian law with its own
scholarship, a summary of which is unnecessary in this article.
184.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); see generally
COHEN, supra note 162, at 221–37.
185.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1996).
186.
See Talton v. Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
187.
Id. at 376–77, 379.
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later law.188 Nearly half a century later, the Supreme Court again
considered the interaction between Tribal courts and the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy. 189
In United States v. Wheeler, an Indian was convicted of a
crime in both tribal and federal courts, and he later challenged the
jurisdiction of the United States. 190 In its decision, the Wheeler
Court acknowledged the longstanding precedent that a tribe’s
power to punish offenders was an important aspect of its retained
sovereignty.191 Relying on Talton, the Court confirmed that a
tribal prosecution does not preclude the existence of federal
jurisdiction since the exercise of authority emanates from two
separate sovereigns with two entirely different sources of
power.192 Based on the decisions in Talton and Wheeler, and the
express exemption in the ICCA, the existence of concurrent tribal
authority to punish Indians for criminal conduct is confirmed.193
However, the MCA is a narrow statute conferring federal
jurisdiction for a select few serious felonies. 194 When an Indian
commits a crime not listed under the MCA against another Indian
in Indian Country, the tribe exercises exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over the Indian offender.195
The Supreme Court has limited the criminal jurisdiction of
tribal courts in one specific, and infamous case: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe. 196 The issue n Oliphant was whether
tribes could exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
commit a crime against an Indian within the tribe’s territory after
two non-Indians entered the Suquamish Indian reservation in
Washington State and proceeded to speed across the highway,
collided with a tribal police vehicle, and were subsequently
188.
Id. at 384.
189.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
190.
Id. at 313.
191.
Id. at 328–29.
192.
Id. at 329–30.
193.
See General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006); See Talton v.
Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978).
194.
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (listing the fourteen
major felonies).
195. Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
196.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191, 212 (1978).
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arrested by tribal law enforcement. 197 After being detained in
tribal facilities, they filed writs of habeas corpus in federal district
court. 198 In Oliphant, the Court held that tribes lack the inherent
authority to punish non-Indians and have not been delegated the
federal authority to do so.199
The basis for the Court’s
determination rested in part on the diminishment of tribal
sovereignty by virtue of tribes’ dependent status. 200
In sum, tribes only have criminal jurisdiction over Indians.201
Where the crime committed falls under the MCA, regardless of the
ethnicity of the victim, the tribe exercises concurrent jurisdiction
along with the federal government. 202 However, if the crime
committed is not listed under the MCA, federal jurisdiction is
precluded by the ICCA exception, and tribal criminal jurisdiction
is exclusive if the victim was Indian. 203 If the victim was nonIndian and the crime committed by the Indian is not an MCAlisted crime, then federal jurisdiction is precluded only if the tribe
has exercised criminal jurisdiction and prosecuted the
individual. 204
3.

State Law Jurisdiction Pre-Public Law 280

In general, the principle that states lack jurisdiction (both
civil and criminal) in Indian Country is foundational in Federal
Indian law. 205 In addition, a multitude of both federal and state
courts have considered whether states could exercise jurisdiction
197.
Id. at 194–95.
198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 208–10.
200. See id.
201.
In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court determined that Indian tribes
lack criminal jurisdiction of non-member Indians. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). For
example, the Navajo Nation would lack jurisdiction over a member of the
Cherokee Nation just as it lacked jurisdiction over a non-Indian. Tribes were
displeased with this decision and sought relief from Congress via a legislative
fix. Congress passed the so-called “Duro-fix” confirming the inherent tribal
authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians—regardless of tribal
citizenship. The congressional authority to enact this legislation was
challenged in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), where the Supreme
Court upheld the Duro-fix.
202. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
203. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
204. Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
205.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).

PEARLFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 10:57 AM

OF “TEXANS” AND “CUSTERS”

65

over criminal conduct in Indian Country under the statutory
structure governing federal criminal jurisdiction. 206 Each decision
has determined that absent an express grant of jurisdiction via
statute, states lack criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.207
The lone exception to this general rule exists for the situation
involving a crime committed in Indian Country between a nonIndian perpetrator and a non-Indian victim.208 In United States v.
McBratney, the Supreme Court determined that state jurisdiction
exists in this limited case. 209 The Court relied on the fact that the
Indian tribe located where the crime occurred does not have a
federally protected interest in the resolution of crime between
non-Indians. 210
4.

Summary Chart

As a way of shorthand, the above principles of jurisdiction are
depicted below in a chart.
Offender
Non-Indian

Victim
Non-Indian

Non-Indian

Indian

Indian

Non-Indian

Jurisdiction
State Jurisdiction is
exclusive of federal and
tribal jurisdiction.
Federal Jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 1152 is
exclusive of state and tribal
jurisdiction.
If listed in 18 U.S.C. §
1153, there is federal
jurisdiction, exclusive of
the state, but probably
not of the tribe. If the listed
offense is not
otherwise defined and
punished by federal law
applicable in the special
maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United
States, state law is
assimilated. If not listed in

206.
COHEN, supra note 162, at 754 n. 168.
207.
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959); Langley v. Ryder, 778
F.2d 1092, 1095–96 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Spears, 647 A.2d 1054, 1062
(Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
208.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 624.
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18 U.S.C. § 1153,
there is federal jurisdiction,
exclusive of the state,
but not of the tribe, under
18 U.S.C. § 1152. If
the offense is not defined
and punished by a
statute applicable within
the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, state
law is assimilated under 18
U.S.C. § 13.
Indian
Indian
If the offense is listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1153, there
is federal jurisdiction,
exclusive of the state, but
probably not of the tribe. If
the listed offense is
not otherwise defined and
punished by federal
law applicable in the
special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, state
law is assimilated. See
section 1153(b). If not
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153,
tribal jurisdiction is
exclusive.
Non-Indian
Victimless
State jurisdictions is
exclusive, although federal
jurisdiction may attach if
an impact on individual
Indian or tribal interest is
clear.
Indian
Victimless
There may be both federal
and tribal jurisdiction.
Figure 1-1. Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Under Public Law 280, 4, (2007), available at https: //www. ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf.

C. Legal and Functional Gaps in Criminal Jurisdiction
The fragmentation of authority for law enforcement
responsibility, investigation of crimes, and prosecution of crimes
creates two basic problems: a legal gap and a functional gap.
1.

The Legal Gap

The legal gap exists where an individual can commit a crime
which the state, federal, and tribal governments are unable to
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address through law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution.
Up until Congress passed Senate Bill S. 47, also known as the
Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, on February
28, 2013, 211 the most prominent example of this problem was in
the area of domestic violence. 212 Statistics indicate that over
seventy percent of Indian woman who are the victim of domestic
violence describe the perpetrator as being non-Indian. 213 This
immediately removes the ability of tribal law enforcement to
intervene without a superseding cooperative agreement with the
county law enforcement. 214 What about the federal government?
The MCA only confers jurisdiction upon the federal government
for fourteen major crimes—none of which include domestic
violence.215 Certainly if the injury sustained by the Native woman
is severe enough, it may trigger federal jurisdiction under the
MCA. 216 Of course, based on Worcester, the State as a general
matter has no ability to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed
against an Indian on the reservation.217 This is the legal gap;
among the various political entities, none of them clearly has the
authority to arrest, investigate, prosecute, and punish the
offender.

211. S. 47 Bill Summary and Status Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:
s.47.
212.
See generally Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic
Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275 (2004) (describing the prevalence and complexities of
legal remedy for domestic violence on Indian reservations).
213.
Lawrence A. Greenfield & Steven K. Smith, American Indians and
Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 8 (1999),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdfindex.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=387.
214.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
215.
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Senate Bills 872, 1192,
and 1763: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. (Nov. 10,
2011) (testimony of Thomas J. Perrelli Assoc. Att’y Gen.), http://www.
justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-1/11-10-11-asg-perrelli-testimony-re-s-872,-s1192-and-s-1763.pdf; Gaylen L. Box, Crow Dog:
Tribal Soverignty &
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 50 ADVOC. 13, 15 (May 2007).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
217.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832); see also Bethany R.
Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate of Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1506–09 (2011).
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The functional gap occurs when jurisdiction is available, yet,
it goes unexercised. In 2008, the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs held a hearing on the high percentage of United States
Attorneys declining criminal cases arising in Indian Country.218
The concern on the part of then Chairman Dorgan and others was
that the United States Attorneys were declining these cases for
the wrong reasons, and Chairman Dorgan sought more detailed
information regarding the basis for declinations. 219
The
functional gap problem exists in federal, state, and tribal law
enforcement contexts. Concern over the federal government’s lack
of accountability to tribal communities and insufficient resources
are commonplace. 220 Indeed, the recent judicial decision in Cole v.
Oravec 221 further illustrates this concern over the efficacy of
exogenous law enforcement in Indian Country. In Cole v. Oravec,
an FBI agent was sued for failing to properly investigate the
deaths of two Crow Indians on the Crow Reservation in
Montana.222 The district court denied qualified immunity to the
FBI agent and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, saying
[t]he amended complaint also sufficiently alleges
discriminatory motive. It alleges that despite the fact
that Bearcrane’s death was ruled a homicide, the non218. Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian
Country: Hearing Before Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 2-4 (Sept. 18,
2008), http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/September182008.pdf.
219.
Id. at 5.
220.
CAROLE GOLDBERG & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280 33–34 (2007),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf; see also
Larry Echohawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian
Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83,
99 (2001-2002); Kevin Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law,
104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 733–34 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, American
Indians]; Kevin Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 827, 829–30 (2006).
221. Cole v. Oravec, 465 Fed. Appx. 687, 688 (9th Cir. 2012); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Ninth Circuit Allows Bivens Action agaisnt FBI Agent that
Failed to Properly Investigate Murder of Indians, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 10,
2012), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/01/10/ninth-circuit-allows-bivensaction-against-fbi-agent-that-failed-to-properly-investigate-murder-ofindians/
222. Id.
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Native American man admitted to shooting Bearcrane,
and there was evidence negating the claim of self-defense,
Oravec failed to properly investigate the case. Moreover,
it alleges that Oravec consistently closed cases involving
Indian victims without adequate investigation, and that
he has been heard to make improper remarks about
female Native American victims of sexual assault. 223
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Washburn
identified the wide cultural divide that can exist between tribal
communities and federal prosecutors as a reason for the existence
of the functional gap. 224 In addition, he notes the general absence
of media attention—also referred to as “external motivations”—as
a potential hindrance to active engagement on the part of federal
prosecutors.225 Finally, it cannot be ignored that federal
prosecutors are simply not located within tribal communities,
thereby requiring them to travel hundreds of miles for one case.226
These three components have led to wide criticism of federal
prosecutors, as indicated by the 2008 Indian Affairs Committee
Hearing, for the failure to allocate proper attention and resources
to Indian Country cases.227
The functional gap can be explained using the terminology set
forth in this article. The federal government is an outsider—a
Custer. The exercise of sanctioning by a Custer is not tied to the
close-knit group’s definition of welfare, and it interferes with the
creation of informal norms that maximize welfare in the aggregate
regarding workaday affairs. It is inefficient in its operation and
destructive in its ramifications.
D. Public Law 280 Changes the Legal Landscape in Six States
1. Origins of Passage
A more problematic example of the imposition of public law by
a Custer is illustrated by the operation of an obscure law referred
to as Public Law 280. Public Law 280 was enacted by Congress in

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 689.
Washburn, American Indians, supra note 220, at 731–32.
Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
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1953.228 The date is relevant in light of the dramatic shifts in
federal policy towards tribal communities during the preceding 20
years. For context, in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”)
provided statutory recognition of Indian tribes as governments
with rights of self-determination. 229 At that time, the United
States was developing policies to spur economic development to
end the economic depression. The IRA contained similar themes
for Indian Country, but also put Native-specific policies in place
that sought to strengthen tribal civilization specifically and
cultural pluralism generally.230 At the heart of the IRA was the
policy that Indian tribes are governmental units and may adapt
on their own terms to modern times. 231
Soon thereafter, a policy reversal occurred in Congress. In
1943, Congress released a study entitled “The Senate Survey of
Conditions Among the Indians of the United States.” 232 The
report heavily criticized the IRA and the underlying policies of the
approaches employed with regard to trust lands, the management
of trust assets and lands, and the strengthening of the Federaltribal relationship. 233 A similar House Report soon followed in
1944 that recommended new measures to assimilate Indians into
the larger American citizenry. 234 These reports fed political forces
that sought to unravel the protections of the IRA. The stage was
set to address the “problems” created by the IRA. 235
An important part of the assimilation policy was the
voluntary relocation program, started in 1931, but fully
implemented by the 1950s.236 The program placed Indians
residing on a reservation in urban areas.237 The rationale was
that sufficient resources did not exist to sustain reservation
228.
Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
229.
Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1934)).
230.
COHEN, supra note 162, at 84.
231.
Id. at 84–89.
232.
Survey of the Conditions of the Indians in the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Indians Affairs, S. Rep. No. 310, 78th
Cong. (1943).
233.
COHEN, supra note 162, at 89.
234.
Id. at 90.
235.
Id. at 89–97.
236.
Id. at 92.
237.
Id.
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economies large enough to accommodate the resident Indians
looking for work.238 Therefore, the relocation of Indians from their
reservation homes to urban areas became official federal policy.239
This policy gained momentum in the early 1950s when Congress
again took action.240
On July 1, 1952, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution seeking legislative proposals “designed to promote the
earliest practicable termination of all federal supervision and
control over Indians.” 241 Soon thereafter, on August 1, 1953,
Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108, which stated
that Congress should “as rapidly as possible . . . make the Indians
. . . subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens [and] to end
their status as wards.” 242 Public Law 280 is a direct expression of
the dramatic policy shift away from strengthening tribal selfdetermination towards assimilation of individual Indians and the
consequent breakdown of tribal governing structures.243 This is a
far cry from the early federal criminal statutes recognizing tribal
community rules and sanctions and shielding them from
interference from external public law enforcement.
Five states (Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, and
California) were covered by the original 1953 law. 244 They are
referred to as the Public Law 280 “mandatory” states. 245 In 1968,
Congress amended Public Law 280 to allow for other states to
“opt-in” and accept the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal
government.246 However, the 1968 amendment conditioned this
transfer upon tribal consent from the tribes located in the state
States accepting the transfer of
seeking jurisdiction. 247
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-2503, 82d Cong. (1952).
242.
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
243. See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. §
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
244. Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the
Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006).
245. TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists
/pl280.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
246. Goldberg, supra note 245, at 703–04.
247. Id.
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jurisdiction after this time are known as “optional states.” 248 For
comparative purposes, a chart is produced below to show where
the jurisdiction has been transferred under Public Law 280.
Offender
Non-Indian

Victim
Non-Indian

Non-Indian

Indian

Indian

Non-Indian

Indian

Indian

Non-Indian

Victimless

Jurisdiction
State jurisdiction is
exclusive of federal and
tribal jurisdiction.
“Mandatory” state has
jurisdiction exclusive of
federal and tribal
jurisdiction. “Option”
state and federal
government have
jurisdiction. There is no
tribal jurisdiction.
"Mandatory" state has
jurisdiction exclusive of
federal government but
not necessarily of the
tribe. "Option" state has
concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts.
"Mandatory" state has
jurisdiction exclusive of
federal government but
not necessarily of the
tribe. "Option" state has
concurrent jurisdiction
with tribal courts for all
offenses, and concurrent
jurisdiction with the
federal courts for those
listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
State jurisdiction is
exclusive, although
federal
jurisdiction may attach in
an option state if
impact on individual
Indian or tribal interest is
clear.

248. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and
Concerns for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, AM. INDIAN DEV. ASSOC.
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/pl280.htm.
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There may be concurrent
state, tribal, and in an
option state, federal
jurisdiction. There is no
state
regulatory jurisdiction.
Figure 1-2. Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Under Public Law 280, 5, (2007), available at https: //www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/222585.pdf.

2.

Victimless

Initial Deficiencies of Public Law 280

As originally passed, Public Law 280 was very simple. It
transferred criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country from the federal government to five, and later six,
states. 249 States were tasked with daily enforcement of state law
in Indian Country. 250 Unfortunately, Public Law 280 failed to
provide funding for states newly tasked with exercising criminal
jurisdiction over potentially huge areas of land and thousands of
Indian people. The lack of additional funding strained police
forces, human resources, physical facilities, and the state criminal
justice system as a whole. 251
Of course, the degree to which the states were overburdened
is not ascertainable since Public Law 280 did not require, or
provide funding for, funds to study the effect of Public Law 280
upon state law enforcement efficacy, crime rates in Indian
Country, or any other aspect of criminal justice. 252 Just as there
was no methodology in place to train law enforcement and prepare
tribal communities for the imposition of state law enforcement,
there was no attempt to address the easily foreseeable clashes and
disputes between tribes and the state. Essentially Congress,
through Public Law 280, completely changed the rules between
these two communities and then locked them in a room together to
fight over the terms of their new relationship. With states having
the ultimate say in all things criminal jurisdiction, already
249.
The original five states were Nebraska, Oregon, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and California. Alaska was added later. TRIBAL COURT
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/pl280.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2013).
250. Id.
251. Goldberg, supra note 245, at 704.
252. See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. §
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
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burdened by the unfunded mandate created by Public Law 280, it
is understandable that states were uninterested in negotiating
mutually
acceptable
solutions
with
Indian
tribes.253
Unfortunately, the unilateral nature of Public Law 280, the
burden it placed on states, and the wholesale renunciation of
fundamental principles of federal Indian law and tribal selfdetermination created a volatile situation that has continued to
the present day.
3.

1968 Amendments

In 1968, Congress amended Public Law 280 by requiring
Indian tribes to consent to any new transfer of criminal
jurisdiction from the federal government to the applicable state
government. 254 The amendments also authorized states currently
exercising criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country pursuant to
Public Law 280 to retrocede, or return, that jurisdiction to the
federal government. 255
The new amendment, it is fair to say from the perspective of
Indian tribes, stopped the loss of jurisdiction in Indian Country.256
Even though the 1968 amendments allowed states to “opt in” to
the Public Law 280 structure, they first had to obtain formal tribal
consent from tribes located in the state.257 As Professor Goldberg
has noted, since the 1968 amendments, no state has successfully
obtained tribal consent for the transfer of jurisdiction to the state
under Public Law 280 sending a clear message regarding the
tribal view of Public Law 280. 258
4.

Public Law 280-like Statutes

A number of other statutes similar to Public Law 280 have
also been passed by Congress. 259 Frequently, in these statutes,
253. See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. §
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
254. Enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §
1321 (1968).
255. While an important aspect of Public Law 280, retrocession is outside
the scope of this article.
256. See Enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (1968).
257. See id.
258. GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 7.
259. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–16 (1978) (R.I.); 25 U.S.C. § 1774 (1990)
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Congress will recognize an Indian tribe or multiple tribes within a
state and will simultaneously grant the state criminal jurisdiction
over crimes occurring on the reservation regardless of the political
affiliation of the perpetrator or victim, i.e. non-Indian or Indian.260
In the West, Washington stands alone as perhaps the most
complex state/tribal/federal criminal jurisdiction in the country.261
While not a mandatory state under Public Law 280, the proposals
to remedy the issues facing tribes in Public Law 280 states are
equally applicable to those states subject to Public Law 280-like
statutes.
E. Consequences of Public Law 280
As discussed above, the imposition of mandatory public law
enforcement from an exogenous source has significant negative
ramifications for the informal norms of the close-knit community.
It may not be the case that all tribal communities located in
Public Law 280 states meet the definition of a close-knit group,
but many will. Some empirical data exists, illustrating how these
tribal communities have fared under Public Law 280. This section
describes the long-term effects created by Public Law 280 and
assesses the present-day problems of Indian tribes in these states.
In the context of the informal norms theory advanced here, these
are the consequences of the imposition of exogenous law on a
close-knit group, i.e. Custer effects.
1.

Long Term Effects of Public Law 280

Halting the Development of Tribal Courts. A small
percentage of Indian tribes in Public Law 280 states have fully
developed comprehensive tribal courts. For example, of the 107
federally recognized Indian tribes in California, only four have an
existing tribal court of some sort. 262 Many of these tribal courts
are limited to exercising jurisdiction over Indian Child Welfare
Act (“ICWA”) cases under the express authorization contained in
(N.Y.); 25 U.S.C. § 1775 (1994) (Conn.); Wash. Rev. Code § 37.12.021 (1963).
260. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35 (1980) (Me.); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60 (1983)
(Conn.); 25 U.S.C. § 941 (1993) (S.C.); 25 U.S.C. § 1771 (1987) (Mass.).
261. GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 10–11; see also Robert T. Anderson,
Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over Indian Country
Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915 (2012).
262. GOLDBERG, supra note 221, at 14.
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ICWA.263 Tribes located in Public Law 280-mandatory states lag
far beyond their non-Public Law 280 counterparts in terms of the
development of tribal courts.
Exacerbation of Tension Between State and Tribes.
States and tribes are by default at odds with one another. 264 The
Supreme Court recognized this fact before the turn of the 19th
century in Kagama by explaining that Indian tribes “owe no
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies.” 265 Scholarship in this
area from Professors Matthew Fletcher and Ezra Rosser describe
the shifting viewpoints on tribal-state relations and the long-term
and short-term benefits derived from negotiated peace in the form
of cooperative agreements. 266 Certainly, state and tribal interests
occasionally dovetail and there are circumstances where they
actually need one another in order to obtain funding or spur
economic development in the area. Federal Indian Law, however,
reflects an on-going conflict between Indians and non-Indians,
Tribal communities and State governments. 267
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court considered the
validity of a Georgia law requiring non-Indians living within the
boundaries of the Cherokee Nation to obtain a state license in
order to reside there.268 The Court determined that the “Cherokee
Nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force . . . ” 269 The Court explained further
that the Georgia state laws “ . . . interfere forcibly with the
relations established between the United States and the Cherokee
nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles
263.
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 93 Stat.
3071(cofidied at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978)).
264.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
265. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
266. See Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative Agreements, the Actual State
of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L. REV. 57 (2007); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007).
267. See Rosser, supra note 267, at 65.
268. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537, 542.
269. Id. at 561.
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of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government
of the union.” 270 What the Court did not say was that, obviously,
the imposition of State law significantly interferes with tribal
communities.
Tribal independence stemming from Worcester created conflict
with the states.271 This is seen as a limitation on state
sovereignty, an affront to the self-determining nature of the
several states, and something that inevitably provides fertile soil
for conflict when tribes use their independence to their advantage.
The situation is little different for tribes. Tribes have been
dealing with states for centuries, frequently seeking judicial
intervention to mediate disputes and lobbying Congress for
changes in federal law for the protection from state encroachment.
Many tribes, both historically and presently, perceive a constant
onslaught by state governments to infringe upon tribal territories,
powers of self-determination, and tribal culture. Tribal existence
as “domestic dependent nations” creates the ambiguity necessary
for Tribes and States to dispute who is more sovereign. 272
Specific Effects on Tribal Criminal Justice Systems.
Public Law 280 has particularized negative effects on law
enforcement in Indian Country. Public Law 280 lacked any
expressed duty on behalf of the states to provide law enforcement
and associated services to Indians, therefore, leaving tribal
communities with no avenue for relief. 273
The development of tribal law enforcement in Public Law 280
states trails far behind that of non-Public Law 280 counterpart
tribal governments, and many lack law enforcement entirely.274
Upon transfer of jurisdiction over Indian Country to the
mandatory states, the federal attitude was that tribes had no need
for their own law enforcement since the state would be enforcing
its criminal laws in Indian Country. 275 Public Law 280 presumed
the states would fulfill the role of Custer: impose daily and

270. Id.
271. See Fletcher, supra note 267, at 81.
272. See The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
273. See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. §
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
274. GOLDBERG, supra note 220, at 13–14.
275. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 244, at 702.

PEARLFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

78

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/2/2014 10:57 AM

[Vol. 19:32

mandatory law enforcement for the tribal community. 276 The
“duty” to provide law enforcement services and prosecute criminal
conduct occurring in Indian Country then rested with the state.277
Tribal communities were subjected to state encroachment directed
by Congress for the specific purpose of removing that attribute of
tribal self-governance. 278
This was the fundamental policy of Public Law 280. It comes
as no surprise that roughly twenty-one percent of tribes in
mandatory Public Law 280 states have their own law enforcement
systems, compared with nearly seventy-five percent of tribes in
non-Public Law 280 states. 279 Only seven out of the 107 Indian
tribes in California have tribally operated police departments.280
The long-term effects of Public Law 280 are clear in this regard.
These are practical and real world consequences of a Custer
operating in a close-knit group, in addition to the fundamental
problem that a Custer forecloses the creation and operation of
informal norms.
2.

Opinions of Public Law 280 in Indian Country

Despite Public Law 280 affecting only five states, tribes
located in these states constitute forty percent of all the tribes in
the lower forty-eight states. 281 This statistic should make clear
that Public Law 280 is a significant problem for a substantial
portion of Indian Country. This fact has not resulted,
unfortunately, in a wealth of statistical data on the specific issues
in Public Law 280 states. A recent report by leading scholar
Professor Carole Goldberg sheds some light on this issue.282
The Report specifically examined the effects of Public Law
280 on tribes and hypothesized that “effective police and justice
systems in Indian country depend on the degree of accountability
of law enforcement and criminal justice to tribal populations, as
well as the adequacy of resources to provide policing and court

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See id.
Id.
Id.
GOLDBERG, supra note 220, at 14.
Id.
Id.
See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 220.
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services.” 283 The Goldberg Report collected data from 350
individuals including “reservation residents, law enforcement
officials, and criminal justice personnel connected with seventeen
different reservations, twelve of which are subject to state
jurisdiction.” 284 Findings relevant to this thesis advanced herein
are explored below.
Crime Rates. The Report was unable to determine whether
crime rates were higher in Public Law 280 states than non-Public
Law 280 states due to insufficient data and the way data is
undifferentiated by county law enforcement.285 A positive result
of this study, despite the unavailability of data, is that some police
departments have reoriented their data collection programs to
differentiate between crime occurring in Indian Country versus
crime occurring on non-Indian land.286
Availability of Law Enforcement. The study found that
reservation residents of Public Law 280 states “report that state
or county law enforcement is less available to them than tribal
police” departments. 287 For comparative purposes, Public Law
280 reservation residents indicate “significantly less police
availability” than counterparts in non-Public Law 280
jurisdictions. 288 Public Law 280 reservation resident complaints
include slow response times, less effective patrolling services, and
higher likelihood of declining service due to remoteness of
location.289 The reason for these deficiencies, as described by
reservation residents, include the perspective that crime in Indian
country is of a lower priority, tension between the Indian and nonIndian community, selective enforcement, and a lack of
resources. 290
This is unsurprising if viewed through the lens of informal
normative theory. Members of a close-knit community will view
the agent of exogenous law enforcement as a Custer. Combined
with the pre-existing and long-standing tensions between Tribes
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at viii.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and States, the Report’s findings are completely expected.
Effective of Cooperative Agreements, Concurrent
Jurisdiction. The Report found that cooperative agreements
“ameliorate, but do not solve, underlying problems of
accountability and resources associated with Public Law 280.”291
The Report found two general types of cooperative agreements:
deputization agreements (allowing tribal police to enforce state
law on the reservation) and law enforcement services agreements
(“pay[ing] county police to provide enhanced services on the
reservation”). 292 The law applied remains foreign to the tribal
community, ignorant of tribal norms, and largely unresponsive to
the needs of the Indian community.
Crime in Indian Country, especially violence against women,
is at a point of crisis. These types of cooperative agreements may
provide short-term benefits in the reduction of the crime rate—
something we cannot show by data because adequate statistics do
not exist to confirm such a hypothesis. But, agreements of this
type work to delay fundamental change regarding the recognition
of tribal communities as valid. They formalize, the role of the
State as a Custer, albeit with the tribal community’s consent. As
a Custer, they have a lower interest in the health and well-being
of the community because it is not their community.
Furthermore, they lack the context in order to determine whether
the close-knit group is healthy because they do not understand
how the group defines welfare.
In addition, the informal norms of the close-knit group are
irrelevant to the Custer’s determination as to the sanctions to
create, when to apply them, and how to apply them. There is a
chance that the sanctions orchestrated by the Custer will not
resonate in the tribal community, thereby inefficiently addressing
the needs of the tribal community. At the same time, the Custer’s
conduct precludes the development and operation of actual
informal norms arising from the community. Indeed, Professor
Goldberg foreshadows the Oravec circumstance when she warns
that “[c]ross-deputization agreements are not without their own
problems, which can include . . . inadequate responses to
reservation calls by the non-Indian agency, and fear or distrust
291.
292.

Id. at 480.
Id.
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from the non-Indian community.” 293
Even if the state agrees to interface with the close-knit tribal
community, it is still a Custer. The imposition of public law will
continue to undermine the creation, enforcement, and efficacy of
informal norms within the tribal community. At their best,
cooperative agreements are simply a more specific type of
community policing. This paper argues for a reinvigoration of
early federal principles recognizing the self-governing nature of
tribal communities, especially where they are close-knit under
Ellickson’s definition and encourage state and federal deference to
those informal normative processes.
VI. PRESENT AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLIC LAW 280 IN
INDIAN COUNTRY

A Custer wreaks havoc on close-knit communities. In the
context of Indian Country, both the federal and state governments
are Custers. However, the effects of state Custers upon tribal
communities is far worse than their federal counterparts.
Primarily, this is because state law enforcement has day-to-day
law enforcement responsibility, whereas the federal law
enforcement in the FBI has only narrow jurisdictional authority.
Tribal communities in Public Law 280 states are subjected to
mandatory and unilateral imposition of external law, which
prevents the meaningful development of informal norms that
maximize aggregate welfare and better curtail Texans. Present
crime data does not allow us to determine the extent of these
negative effects comparatively between Public Law 280 tribal
communities and non-Public Law 280 tribal communities. Even if
that data were available, such information would not allow for a
one-to-one comparison since tribal communities are simply not
fungible. Not all tribal communities are close-knit, however, and
thus, that is where the inquiry should focus: how to assist those
tribal communities that have those traits of close-knitedness.
In 2010, Congress endeavored to address various problems in
Indian Country criminal jurisdiction. 294 Congress fundamentally
changed Public Law 280 in the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
293.
Id. at 29.
294. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221,
124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
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(TLOA). 295 Section 221 of the Act provides tribes in mandatory
Public Law 280 states the opportunity to request the Attorney
General of the United States to reassume criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country.296 Tribes may do this unilaterally without prior
approval from the State. 297 The determination to accept
jurisdiction rests solely with the Department of Justice. 298 In
essence, Section 221 turns Public Law 280, the original 1953
version, on its head by placing States in the former position of
tribes as overlooked, ignored, and un-consulted entities.
This policy change will be largely ineffective as the defects
mirror those that caused the original failure of Public Law 280.
First, it fails to provide funding to ensure that upon re-assumption
of jurisdiction the federal government’s law enforcement agencies
and the United States Attorney have adequate staff, resources,
and means to properly investigate and prosecute criminal conduct.
This is especially problematic in light of the current opinion that
the federal presence in Indian Country criminal matters is
insufficient. 299 Second, there are no safeguards to guide an
orderly transition from two sovereigns with concurrent
jurisdiction to three. Tension will still exist and it will likely
increase. Third, while the change in policy is normatively and
legally preferable, it is relevant that states are being subject to the
unilateral will of Indian tribes and the federal government.
Preventing States from having a voice as to the allocation of
responsibility among three sovereign entities simply compounds
the problem and will almost certainly make any transitional
period more difficult.
The policy change, while welcome, is late; and it is impaired
by the defects mentioned above. While some tribal communities
might benefit from this legislative change, close-knit tribal
communities would benefit from legislation that protects the
creation and operation of informal norms from Custers. There is
295. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 124
Stat. 2258 (2010).
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
See, e.g., Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in
Indian Country: Hearing before Comm. On Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. (Sept.
18, 2008), http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/September182008.pdf.
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precedent for this policy in federal criminal law and the emerging
scholarship from Richman and Ellickson provide an empirical
basis for its codification.
A. Legally Recognized Informal Norms for Close-Knit Tribal
Communities
This article began with the archetypes of the Texan and the
Custer. Informal norms solve the problem of the Texan but the
presence of a Custer fundamentally impairs the creation and
operation of informal norms. Therefore, my theory calls for a
structure that prevents the Custer from interfering until informal
norms have attempted to remediate the Texan. To put it
differently, my theory argues for a principle like that found in
administrative law which requires a plaintiff to exhaust
administrative remedies before suing the agency in court.
Indeed, the Shasta County community already operates in
this way as described in Ellickson’s work.300 Cattle trespass law
exists and creates legal rights between parties. 301 Parties may
avail themselves of their legal rights in court, but Ellickson’s point
is that they rarely—if ever—do so because resolving the dispute
by informal norms is more efficient and maximizes aggregate
welfare in the community. 302 To make Shasta County resemble
the situation for tribal communities in Public Law 280 states,
imagine the following scenario. In Shasta County, a law is passed
that creates “Cattle Trespass Officers” that monitor the
whereabouts of cattle, property lines, and damages caused by
cattle trespass. Upon identifying trespassing cattle, the officer
removes the cattle, attempts to identity the owner, and notifies
the owner to come and get the cattle. The mandatory presence
and enforcement of external law prevents the informal norms from
ever arising, much less being effective.
The transaction costs are high in the Cattle Trespass Officer
scenario. They are minimized under Ellickson’s theory of informal
norms. Indeed, that is a component of how welfare is maximized
through the minimization of transaction costs. It would be
300.
301.
302.

ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 40.
Id.
Id.
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inefficient, through the production of externalities, higher
transaction costs, etc., to have a mandatory system of cattle
trespass law and cattle trespass enforcers. It is more efficient for
residents to be able to conduct their workaday relations as they
see fit, consistent with their inter-personal relationships. The law
implicitly recognizes this and protects the development of those
norms by making optional any resort to external law. A structure
creating a mandatory Cattle Trespass Officer is unnecessary,
unwieldy, and less efficient. In addition, the rules imposed and
sanctions created bear no relation to the close-knit community’s
definition of welfare.
Tribal communities in Public Law 280 states are little
different—they are all subject to the actions of state law
enforcement.303 Tribes already view the imposition of law by this
exogenous entity as a fundamental intrusion in their culture,
lifeways, and identity. As mentioned before, the idea that tribal
communities enjoy some degree of self-governing authority is not
seriously in dispute. Traditionally, Indian Law scholars and tribal
advocates have asserted that self-governing authority, or
sovereignty, is the basis of the argument for the preclusion of state
law enforcement and revocation of Public Law 280.
The problem with this argument is that it reduces to the
dispute that states and tribes always have: “who is more
sovereign?” My theory here provides a substantively different
basis for precluding state law enforcement, the informal norms of
tribal communities maximize welfare within the community and
result in greater public safety for both residents of Indian Country
and those in neighboring non-Indian communities. Here, I differ
with Ellickson who suggests that the operation of informal norms
serves to impoverish outsiders, or make them worse off. 304 In this
context, effective informal norms in a tribal community reduce the
financial obligation of state law enforcement while also enhancing
public safety for both communities.
To be clear, tribal communities have long engaged in
resolving the Texan problem through traditional informal
remedies, such as banishment. 305 Banishment is a sanction that
303. See Pub. L. No. 83-280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. §
1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1953)).
304. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 169.
305. See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL
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arises from the violation of an informal norm.306 Tribal
communities also have a history of addressing the Custer problem.
Such a dispute with a foreign state was resolved either by war or
by treaty. Neither is an option for tribal communities in this day.
So, the question is, how does the tribal community solve the
Custer problem now? Would solving the Custer problem solve
their criminal problems? Tribal communities, at least some of
them, seem to fit the definition of a close-knit community set forth
by Ellickson.
A genuine solution cannot simply be the removal of the prior
incorrect policy. A fundamentally different approach than that
employed by the TLOA is needed. The principal problem with
developing the best policy is that Congress must enact it. There
may be alternative methods for implementing the structure
presented below, but passage of a specific piece of legislation
implementing this targeted approach would ensure uniformity.
B. Close-Knit Communities Solve Their Own Problems Best
Two basic principles point to the conclusion that tribal
communities solve tribal problems best. First, a principle long
codified by federal statutes demonstrates that tribal governments
have the inherent authority and the capability of addressing
criminal issues on their lands among Indians. This fact is
reflected in the ICCA exceptions precluding federal jurisdiction
where the tribe has already prosecuted the offending Indian and it
is further confirmed by the Supreme Court in Talton, Wheeler, and
United States v. Lara. 307 Second, federal statutes and case law
recognize that criminal issues in Indian Country have an intratribal character to them that makes them appropriate for
resolution by local rules rather than external entities. This is
apparent in the exception to the ICCA regarding the preclusion of
federal jurisdiction where the criminal conduct involves both an

LEGAL STUDIES 359 (AltaMira Press 2010).
306. Id.
307. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193; United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayers, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). “This section
shall not extend to . . . any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe . . . ” General
Crimes Act,18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
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Indian offender and victim. 308
Tribal communities are not so distinct from other rural closeknit communities. Problems in these areas are best solved by the
people who live there. This is, perhaps, an easier and more
general summary of Ellickson’s theory. In the criminal context,
this concept takes on an even more important role. Assistant
Secretary Washburn has explained that criminal law and
jurisdiction are both important to community self-determination
and that this concept has “long been settled as a matter of
criminal law theory.” 309 He continues on, stating “criminal laws
codify the moral foundations of the community.” 310 The import of
criminal laws emanating from the community in which they are
applicable has been recognized for decades. 311 These individuals
and families are what constitute a community, they create the
norms regarding conduct that is and is not acceptable. Local
individuals and leaders are best positioned to (1) identify the
problems in the community and (2) identify the norms at work
within that particular community. Again, these are the workaday
affairs to which informal norms arise. The fundamental problem
with statutes like Public Law 280 is that a community is left
without voice or choice in designing how their community is to be
governed. To use Ellickson’s terminology, they do not have a say
in defining welfare and how to maximize it in the aggregate.
For tribal communities in Public Law 280 states, an outsider
is not only policing them, but they are subject to laws that may
not comport with their own tribal values. This is why the former
chairman of the Soboba Band made his reference to Custer’s 7th
Cavalry—for the Soboba community there seemed to be no way of
308. “This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian . . . ” 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The
importance of resolving intra-tribal disputes at the local level exists in the
civil context as well in Indian Country, as in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, where an enrollment dispute did not give rise to federal
jurisdiction. See 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
309.
Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 834 (2006).
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
“Classical scholars since at least Emil Durkheim have
recognized a clear and strong relationship between community values and
criminal law. As Durkheim described, criminal laws are the tangible
embodiment of the community's sacred moral values.” Id. at 835 (citations
omitted).
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creating an alternative method of addressing the criminal issues
on the reservation that complied with the needs, values, and
culture of the tribal community. 312 Where a Custer exerts
authority over all of these areas, it should come as no surprise
that the tribal community feels unheard and unfairly treated.313
This tension undermines the ability of law enforcement, and other
aspects of the state justice system, to be effective. Simply put,
members of communities must be invested in the process (how the
rules are created) and the product (the implementation and
outcome of the rules). As stated by Basso in his description of
Western Apache, the Tribal language, stories, and the place all
bear directly on the identity of the community and of the
individuals.314 Therefore, the Custer crushes the identity of the
community in addition to less efficiently addressing concerns over
criminal conduct in the community.
C. Insulating Informal Norms by Requiring Exhaustion
Informal norms should govern close-knit tribal communities,
but members of the tribal community must have access to law
enforcement—be it state or federal. There is a structure that
allows for the intervention of external law enforcement that does
not result in such intervention amounting to a Custer’s conduct.
The key component is making access to external law enforcement
voluntary on the part of the community member rather than a
mandatory obligation of the external entity. By making the
intervention of external law enforcement voluntary rather than
mandatory, the circumstance resembles that in Shasta County
where an action in trespass was available to parties, but not
imposed on them.
An exhaustion requirement would serve to make external law
enforcement’s job easier as well. Individuals in the community
312. Kelly, supra note 2.
313. Of course, some tribes in the present day borrow heavily from their
state and federal counterparts in creating a criminal code or establishing
procedural rules for the prosecution of charges against individuals.
Importantly, tribes that engage in such borrowing do so by choice rather than
by mandate which makes a difference. Regardless, even where tribes borrow
heavily from state counterparts, they may have their own law enforcement
agencies who actually enforce the law within the tribal community—a
distinct difference with tribal communities in Public Law 280 states.
314. BASSO, supra note 108.
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will develop the facts and issues and attempt to resolve them
organically, which may reduce the caseload for officers at the
outset. In addition, even if community members are unable to
resolve the dispute, issues of contention and agreement will have
been identified, thereby doing some of the investigative work for
the officer already. This allows for a quicker resolution of the
issue.
Finally, this reduces the antagonism that typically exists
between external law enforcement and tribal communities. Under
this structure, respect and deference to the tribal community
precedes the external law enforcement—the role is substantially
different. Where tension is reduced, it allows the external law
enforcement to more easily resolve the dispute.
D. Native Nation Building through Informal Norms
This structure sends a very different message to tribal
communities than that expressed in Section 221 of the TLOA.315
The mere (optional) modification of Public Law 280, by providing
the federal government with shared jurisdiction, tells tribes that
they are ill fit to create, develop, and regulate behavior in their
own communities. 316 The exhaustion requirement creates an
incentive in tribal communities to reinvigorate, enhance, and
sustain their traditional values and customs and put them into
practice on a daily basis. This is an opportunity to engage in true
Native Nation building by combining aspects of traditional tribal
culture with the demands of 21st century society.
Although the history of criminal issues for tribes under Public
Law 280 states is dark, there may be a benefit to creating a policy
that re-build these normative structures from the ground up.
From this perspective, the near total absence of tribal courts and
police forces in Public Law 280 states presents an opportunity for
real comprehensive change in these communities.
E. Approaches for Implementation
Implementing the policy of insulating informal norms from
external law enforcement can take a variety of forms. Two will be
315. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221,
124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
316. See id.
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covered here: legislation and through cooperative agreements.
There is precedent for the legislative approach to implementing
Native Nation building. Congress passed the Indian SelfDetermination Act in 1975 and authorized tribes to contract with
the federal government and take over particular trust services
previously carried out by local BIA agency offices. 317 This
legislation came about during a renewed push for selfdetermination in Congress and the Executive Branch, it was a
response to the growing frustration with the performance of the
BIA. 318 The money previously appropriated to the BIA office for
discharging that duty would be provided to the tribe instead.319
For example, a tribe could propose to take over the realty
functions of the local BIA office and would then be responsible for
carrying out the realty duties, such as negotiating leases and
performing appraisals, for tribal and individual beneficiaries. In
1987, a pilot program was created in which a number of tribes
were selected to test the efficacy of the program. The same
approach could be used to implement the policy of Native Nation
building in Public Law 280 states.
Even in the absence of a legislative directive, close-knit tribal
communities could enter into cooperative agreements with local
law enforcement to identify the parameters where the tribal
community will be left alone. This type of agreement is subject to
politics and the respective bargaining positions of the parties. In
other words, the external law enforcement has to agree to not
exercise its federally created authority under certain criteria to be
negotiated in the cooperative agreement. Under this approach,
community leaders from both groups would have to come to
recognize the sovereignty of the other, which may be asking a lot.
VII. CONCLUSION

There are many benefits to the TLOA that affect the Indian
Country in non-Public Law 280 states, but the rhetoric regarding
its successes is plainly inapplicable to Public Law 280 tribes. The
number of affected tribes in mandatory Public Law 280 states is
317. Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).
318. Id.
319. Id.
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simply too great to warrant the type of absentee policy enacted in
the TLOA. The approach offered in the TLOA pacifies tribal
communities by moving away from solitary reliance upon the state
to enforce criminal laws and prosecute offenders while shifting the
burden to the federal government, which remains ill equipped to
effectively address crime in Indian Country. The Custer role has
been doubled to include both the state and federal governments.
Local communities solve local problems best. Indian tribes are no
exception and are also well positioned, in light of the history of
tribal political and governmental structures, to accept this
responsibility and succeed. Many tribal communities in Public
Law 280 states will meet the definition of a close-knit group, and
still more will contain those cultural and geographical isolating
traits that enhance the efficacy of informal norms in those
communities. Informal norms are likely to be more effective in
maximizing aggregate community welfare, as defined by the
community. This is the essence of self-government, and if allowed
to operate through social forces, then the results will likely bear
fruit for both close-knit group members as well as outsiders.

